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The Voices of Silence:
Cognition, Culture, and Racism
By BEVERLY HORSBURGH*
SOMETHING EXTRAORDINARY CAN happen when individuals
gather together and form a crowd. I know this because of my own
experience on the day that the jury announced their verdict in the
0. J. Simpson trial. I was in an auditorium filled with students and
professors who responded to the news with expressions of joy and tri-
umph untempered by the conventions ordinarily restraining human
behavior. The roaring voices and the stamping feet made it seem as if
everyone in the room was performing some sort of atavistic, rites-of-
spring ritual dance. It was a grotesque pageant staged by Borges. It was
science fiction made real through a television broadcast that trans-
formed the audience into creatures predating the evolution of the
homo sapiens species. The crowd had regressed in time and become
our remote ancestors-I mean the ones whose genes we carry, even
though they are but dimly remembered and usually suppressed from
consciousness. It seemed to me that our ancestors came to life that
day because some sacred primeval right to control and batter females
had been vindicated during the trial. Because I thought the trial was
supposed to be about society's failure to protect women, which is
hardly a matter worthy of celebration, I was shocked and saddened
over such an unseemly outburst of enthusiasm.
With these sentiments in mind, I left the auditorium and, on my
way to the parking lot, spotted a construction crew working on build-
ing a new addition to the school. The workers were African-American.
I impulsively stopped and called out "They announced the verdict!"
The men turned and faced me with hope and fear in their eyes. At
that moment my point of view completely changed and, with genuine
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. I thank Stephanie
Wildman for helping me understand the power of silence. I also thank Jean Thomas for
sharing her thoughts on the persistence of racism. I especially thank Andy Cappel for
suggesting I study cognitive theory and affording me the benefit of his extraordinary
insight.
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pleasure, I shouted "Not guilty!" The men screamed "On all counts?" I
nodded my head and smiled.
On the long drive home, I pondered my two conflicting states of
mind. Surely there were good reasons to consider the trial a victory, in
light of its public exposure of racism and incompetence within the
criminal justice system. But why should the need to reveal this injus-
tice be at the expense of recognizing the harm of domestic abuse? In
my writings I draw on two schools of thought: feminism and critical
race theory. To me, these disciplines are complementary and often
intertwined. I had assumed the two would always be compatible, an
ideal marriage based on similar goals and sympathetic understanding.
Now, my own core values were at odds, and I despaired at the thought
of compromising one to honor the other.
The next day I called Stephanie Wildman, a colleague who be-
came one of my closest friends as soon as I began to read her sensitive
and innovative scholarship. Eventually, we met in person when I in-
vited Stephanie to be a guest speaker at St. Thomas Law School.
Through the years she has mentored me, other professors in the legal
academy, and a multitude of grateful students. As always, Stephanie's
advice was straightforward and heartfelt. She told me that if, at times,
we must choose one value over another, issues of race should come
before issues of gender. I think this statement instantiates Stephanie's
remarkable moral wisdom and character. Stephanie is admired for
her insight and brilliance, but also loved for her kindness and per-
sonal commitments. Her dedication to the concerns of minorities, in-
cluding her pioneering efforts to increase the number of black law
school professors,' represents a standard that many academicians as-
pire to reach in their own work and lives. Furthermore, the directness
and clarity of Stephanie's response, her ability to capture the essen-
tials in just a few words, indicates one of the many reasons for her
success as a scholar and teacher.
Stephanie's candid expression of her values in our telephone
conversation reminded me that feminists must be willing to place race
in the forefront, or we do not embrace the problems of all women,
nor do we admit the degree to which racist attitudes infect all who are
white. Similarly, in her writings, Stephanie has cautioned legal schol-
ars to be careful in analogizing sex discrimination to race discrimina-
1. Through the storytelling device, Stephanie has educated the academic commu-
nity on the importance of a diverse faculty and the difficulties one encounters in attempt-
ing to achieve this goal. See Stephanie Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of
Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1625, 1633-35 (1990).
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tion.2  While analogies enhance our comprehension of the
experiences of others and build bridges across subcultures, they also
tend to falsely equate various forms of oppression, make it easy for
whites to avoid viewing themselves as the beneficiaries of a racist social
order, and minimize the enduring nature of race-based prejudice.3 In
addition, Stephanie has taught us that being white is, in itself, a privi-
leged status and that white privileges are exhibited in imperceptible
ways. 4 The voices of the white majority dominate our culture, yet this
majority need not voice its objection to racist speech and insulting
behavior. 5 There is a voice of silence that is just as much a performa-
tive act of power as the voice of speech. Both speech and silence re-
flect and reinforce the speaker's participation in a system based on
the subordination of African-Americans.
Because I agree with my good friend Stephanie, and wish to
thank her for her teaching in a meaningful way, I attempt, in this
Article, to shed some light on why racism has come to be such an
intractable form of prejudice in our society. I focus on one particular
aspect of silence: the biases in the cognitive architecture of the mind,
supporting the type of racism that operates on a nondiscursive, un-
conscious level. Specifically, I propose that a folk model of "natural
kinds" of human beings plays a role in sustaining a race-based ideol-
ogy. Arising out of a complex mix of racist cultural influences in the
environment, and the inherent cognitive ability to distinguish the pri-
mary color of various animate and inanimate objects, this mental con-
struct represents a belief in the significance of color as a manifestation
of the genetic inferiority of African-Americans who, as a matter of evo-
lutionary biology, are thought to be members of a subspecies of
humankind.
Part I of this Article briefly comments on the persistence of ra-
cism in our society despite reformist efforts. This Part also contains an
overview of contemporary writings on race that discuss the psychologi-
cal factors motivating negative attitudes toward African-Americans,
and interfering with the ability of whites to recognize-as well as effec-
2. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DuKE L.J.
397 (1991).
3. See id. at 399, 401, 404, 407-09.
4. See Stephanie M. Wildman, with Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 573, 575 (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995); see also STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED (1996) (ana-
lyzing the unacknowledged privileges of whiteness).
5. See Wildman & Davis, supra note 4, at 575.
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tively rid themselves of-prejudice. Part II summarizes the fundamen-
tal operations of the cognitive system and describes the development
of cultural models, including, in particular, the folk model of natural
kinds. The last section of Part II addresses the durability of these
mental constructs, but also explains that recurrent encounters with
African-Americans in social situations can cause a folk model of natu-
ral kinds to change so that new, more tolerant models can be created.
In conclusion, this Article argues that combating racism requires a
practice-based approach, grounded in the reality of every-day exper-
iences. Instead of developing more theoretical perspectives on race,
we need to build concrete and localized forms of integration. The
presence of micro-sociological structures in which blacks and whites
regularly and frequently interact to further commonly shared, com-
munity-related goals has the potential to break down stereotypes and
transform social attitudes.
I. Theories on the Tenacity of Racism
A. The Failure to Eliminate Nineteenth-Century Racism
The motivating forces driving nineteenth-century racism are
abundantly clear, considering that relationships between Europeans
and Africans were, from the onset, systematically tied to the needs of
an agrarian society. Economic gain and the demand for a cheap and
permanent labor force led to the institutionalization of slavery and the
invention of race as a marker that signified the innate inferiority of
the African people. A race-based ideology, constituting religious be-
liefs6 and pseudoscientific theories on Africans as a subspecies of hu-
mankind, 7 legitimized the regime as a part of the natural order, and
expiated, to a large extent, any sense of guilt that might have arisen
over such blatant exploitation. However, as we enter the twenty-first
century, it is more difficult to understand the disparity in socioeco-
6. SeeJEFFREY M. BLUM, PSEUDOSCIENCE AND MENTAL ABILITY 99 (1978); THOMAS F.
GOSSETr, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 5, 62-63 (1963); C. ERIC LINCOLN,
RACE, RELIGION, AND THE CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 23-59 (1984).
7. For an in-depth analysis of pre-scientific theories on race, see K Anthony Appiah,
Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMy GUTMANN,
COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30-71 (1996). See generally STEPHEN
JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); PAT SHIPMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF RACISM:
HUMAN DIFFERENCES AND THE USE AND ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1994) (analyzing scientific theo-
ries on race). An overview of the various approaches can be found in Beverly Horsburgh,
Schrodinger's Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an
Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of
Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 531, 538-55 (1996).
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nomic status between blacks and whites.8 After all, we prohibit dis-
crimination through our legal system and sanction those who engage
in racist behavior or utter racist opinions that violate broadly shared
informal norms. From a strictly financial perspective, in an interna-
tional market, discrimination is an irrational course of conduct for
employers because it excludes potentially valuable employees and is
inefficient for society as a whole because it limits educational and busi-
ness opportunities to one segment of society. Indeed, paradoxically,
public pronouncements condemning racism and the passage of laws
to combat discrimination have led to a widespread collective action
problem;9 a good many whites are convinced that prejudice is a thing
of the past and that there is no longer a need for affirmative actionI °
or to join together in the common interest of ensuring that progress is
made and more aggressive measures are initiated. Given the tenacity
of racism and the inadequacy of the expressive function of formal
law,11 informal social disapproval, and the discipline of the market to
8. Recent statistics report that the median income of 48,070 white, married couples
in 1997 was $52,098, whereas the median income of 3,921 black families was $45,372. See
THE NEW YORK TIMES 2000 ALMANAC 333 (John W. Wright ed., 1999) (citing U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES
(1997)). Black incomes are about 60% of whites, but there is a significant gap in wealth.
For example, Bill Gates possesses more securities-based wealth than all 33 million African-
Americans combined. See Courtland Milloy, Sharing the Wealth is Not Enough, THE WASH.
POST, Sept. 19, 1999, at Col. See also David B. Wilkins, Introduction: The Context of Wealth, in
K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE
24-26 (1996), (discussing the marginality and vulnerability of the black middle-class). Mid-
dle-class, black households are one-third poorer, depend more on two paychecks, and sup-
port more family members than white, middle-class households. See id. at 24. Moreover,
blacks tend to work in manufacturing and in the government sector, two areas of employ-
ment that have been severely affected by downsizing. See id. at 23-25.
9. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. Rv. 943,
993 (1995) (defining the collective action problem as the obstacles that an individual or
part of the collective, such as the legislature, encounters in attempting to "induc[e] a col-
lective response from a sufficiently large portion of the total society" to accomplish a col-
lective benefit, such as transformation in the social meaning of race).
10. Subsequent to Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (1996), which held that the
University of Texas School of Law's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the law school had only accepted five African-Americans by April of 1997. See Hearing on
H.R. 6, The Higher Educ. Amendments of 1998 Title III and Urban and Community Serv. Pro-
grams, 105h Cong. (1997) (written statement of Dr. Thomas Cole, President, Clark Atlanta
University, Atlanta, Georgia). In 1996, 65 blacks were admitted to the law school. See id.
After Proposition 209 was passed in California, UCLA law school selected 21 blacks in
1997, representing an 80% decline in black enrollment as compared with the previous
year. See id.
11. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2021 (1996) (suggesting that law influences behavior through its alteration of the social
meaning underlying customary norms by approving or condemning certain actions and
arrangements).
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transform social attitudes, scholars have sought to diagnose the pa-
thology of race and search for reasons explaining its resistance to
treatment.
B. Sustaining Racism: The Voices of Silence
Charles Lawrence is one of the first legal theorists to investigate
the manner in which race continues to be a permanent feature in our
environment and to take into account the interplay between racism,
cultural norms, and the dynamics of human motivation. He asks
whites to listen to the voice of silence, the inner voice within the self,
and draws attention to unconscious racism: habits of thought that lin-
ger in the recesses of the mind even though there is no awareness of
their presence.1 2 Lawrence argues that, although racist attitudes are
deeply ingrained in our culture, at this point in time, societal ethics
dictate that such ideas are immoral; it is no longer socially acceptable
to express prejudice against a minority.13 Racist beliefs henceforth
arouse uncomfortable feelings of guilt, as well as conflicting emo-
tional states of mind, both of which are repressed from conscious-
ness.14 However tacitly communicated, negative stereotypes about
African-Americans-the cultural baggage of slavery-are still handed
down from generation to generation by relatives, peers, authority
figures, and the media. These stereotypes both influence the judg-
ments and behavior of whites, as well as define the content of the
social meaning of race.15 Cultural learning is not, for the most part,
explicitly taught, but is based on the transmission of unarticulated be-
liefs, preferences, and commonly shared understandings that are ab-
sorbed simply by interacting in this society. 16 The semiotics,
systemacity, and normativity of racism 17 are, therefore, not easily
substantiated.18
Barbara Flagg responds to Lawrence's concerns by providing a
perspective on discrimination that is intended to sensitize whites to
12. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987).
13. See id. at 323.
14. See id. at 322.
15. See id. at 323.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 330-31, 356-58.
18. See id. at 336, 341-44. Noting that repressed feelings of racism find expression in
actions or signs that convey negative attitudes about African-Americans, Lawrence pro-
poses that the presence of racial discrimination should be judged according to a cultural
meaning test: whether or not the behavior is commonly understood as signaling a racially
symbolic message. See id. at 355-56.
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the subtle signs of unconscious racism and allow them to understand
they are responsible for the phenomenon's normative and systemic
characteristics. She claims whites do not view themselves as having a
color and, perforce, "are effectively raceless in the eyes of other
whites."' 9 Consequently, notwithstanding the best of intentions on the
part of white decision-makers, neutral criteria reflect unconscious ra-
cism inasmuch as they are derived from white experiences, behavioral
expectations, and values.20 Flagg calls for whites to work on develop-
ing a conscious sense of their own color.21 Listening to the voice of
silence, in this case, requires whites to be willing, on a deep psycholog-
ical level, to admit they are privileged, realize the partiality of their
vantage point, and acknowledge that not mentioning race nonethe-
less references it, thereby reinforcing, through acts of omission, the
advantages of whites and the marginalization of blacks.
In contrast with Barbara Flagg, who focuses on the unintended
yet insidious nature of unconscious racism, Kimberl Crenshaw views
the social construction of race as serving a deliberate political purpose
and contends racism manipulates the social reality of whites and lulls
them into an acceptance of the status quo; race is the instrument that
sustains a class-based hierarchical system.22 Implying that the, seduc-
tive power of racism lies in its enhancement of the self-esteem of
whites on an unconscious level, Crenshaw points out that the unspo-
ken-yet widespread-belief in the cultural inferiority of African-
Americans induces the white under-class to take comfort in their sup-
posed superiority, act against their own best interests by identifying
with the elite, and assume that the most meaningful of social bonds
are predicated on color.23 Crenshaw's voice of silence, then, involves
stifling the voices of whites who, because of racism, do not speak out
against the unjust distribution of resources and the oppressive eco-
nomic conditions that harm both blacks and whites.
The last scholar I mention, Iris Young, ventures further into the
workings of the mind. She identifies the primary level of an individ-
19. BarbaraJ. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Require-
ment of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969-73 (1993).
20. See id. at 973, 979. Flagg names the unconsciousness of whiteness the "trans-
parency phenomenon." Id. at 957. For instance, explains Flagg, the statement by a white
individual that she has a friend who is "tall, dark and handsome" contains an unspoken
cultural assumption that the friend is white. See id. at 973. The point is that there is no need
to signify the friend's race unless it differs from the implied normative standard.
21. See id. at 970-73.
22. See Kimberlh Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitima-
tion in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1360, 1369-72 (1988).
23. See id. at 1371-72, 1379-81.
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ual's sense of subjecthood, the level of "ontological integrity," which is
the situs of the basic security system of a subject and the storage place
for bodily-threatening experiences. 24 Young examines this basic secur-
ity system split off from the subject's fragile sense of self-identity, com-
petence, and autonomy. 25 These unconscious, repressed experiences
are released in the form of a nonverbal language, displayed in the
subject's bodily behavior, specific modes of speech, voice tone, and
other symbolic representations. 26 A subject maintains her basic secur-
ity system in social encounters through the use of self-defense mecha-
nisms, which reassert and reinforce the projection of an integrated
self.27 One mechanism a subject relies upon as a means of reinstating
a sense of self-identity is intertwined with racism: the proclivity to react
to feelings of inadequacy and endangerment by expressing aversion,
nervousness, condescension, and stereotyping towards blacks. 28
Young grounds her analysis in Julia Kristeva's concept of abjec-
tion: feelings of loathing and fear that accompany the infant's trau-
matic development of a sense of boundary between the self and
other.29 To protect against boundary transgressions, individuals resort
to a strategy of aversion from those who remind them of their primary
infantile sensations and, thus, are seen as threatening the precarious
self/other separation and the very perception of one's subjecthood. 30
While Young seems to suggest that abjection is a universal part of the
growth of the human personality, she makes it clear that the choice as
to which group or groups to target is culturally specific, based on the
historical contingencies of a given society.31 But, once the selection is
made, the abject group is locked into the identity anxieties of the ma-
jority.3 2 Accordingly, for Young, grasping the workings of contempo-
rary racism requires studying the voice of silence-the defensive
strategies revealed in bodily behavior and gestures, which are the sig-
naling devices of aversion-based prejudice that cause standards of in-
telligence and aesthetic beauty to be freighted with unconscious
racism. 33
24. IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 131 (1990).
25. See id. at 131-32 (citing ANTHONY GIDDONS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 79
(1984)).
26. See id. at 132.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 133-34.
29. See id. at 142-43.
30. See id. at 143-45.
31. See id. at 145.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 133-35, 141.
[Vol. 34
COGNITION, CULTURE, AND RACISM
C. Another Voice of Silence: The Cognitive Operations of
the Mind
Iris Young, along with the other previously discussed scholars, un-
derscores the sheer power of silence as a specific type of communica-
tive activity that preserves racist thinking and practices without the
conscious awareness of the speakers. What we gain from the writings
of these scholars is a recognition of the many unspoken-and yet con-
stantly transmitted-messages, signaling intentions and denoting so-
cial meanings so widely shared that there is no need for words.
Furthermore, the authors effectively prove that regulations designed
to sanction an individual social actor's intentional discriminatory con-
duct are ill-equipped to address racism's psychological dimensions.
Their theories on the genesis or purpose of racism also reveal the frus-
trations we face in attempting to eradicate a mindset which individual
social actors are programmed to deny. However, the problem with a
strictly psychologistic perspective is that, generally speaking, psychol-
ogy, in and of itself, does not fully explain the precise means by which
the mind absorbs, processes, and retains cultural information that
shapes attitudes about race and motivates behavior. What is missing is
an investigation of the complex interrelationship between external
cultural forces and internal cognitive operations that together frame
and give meaning to experiences, as well as guide responses to social
situations. Moreover, because cultural learning includes the acquisi-
tion of information or ideas about the inferiority of African-Ameri-
cans, and the retention of cultural knowledge requires the formation
of nearly indestructible structures that are hard-wired into the mind,
the cognitive system, to some extent, acts to stabilize racism. Conse-
quently, there are important reasons to broaden our outlook to in-
clude studies dedicated to discovering the constitutive elements of the
human cognitive system governing our thinking process, our capacity
to reason, and our interpretations of reality. Part II of this article will,
therefore, shift the focus of the inquiry away from an emphasis on
Freudian or post-Freudian psychology, and turn to the findings of cog-
nitive psychology, anthropology, and linguistics. These disciplines of-
fer us valuable information concerning racism's peculiarly
intransigent nature.
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II. The Role of Cognition in Sustaining Racism
A. A Brief Overview of Cognitive Processes
The research and experiments of cognitive scientists have shown
that human beings understand their surroundings by employing two
different kinds of cognition. Serial symbolic processing refers to a
style of thought, a method of knowledge acquisition, and a specific
reasoning style in which information about the environment is
recoded by the mind into linguistic symbols that are manipulated se-
quentially, or in a chain of steps, according to the formal rules of logic
and compositional syntax.3 4 Along with this rule-bound and logic-
based system, there is also an alternative mode of thinking, reasoning,
and learning that is usually designated as the connectionist model of
cognition. 3 5 Connectionist reasoning processes involve an architec-
tural structure in the mind which is responsible for our skill at classify-
ing objects of recognition and extracting information from the
outside world that we reserve for use in the future. 36 This mental rec-
ognition and sorting mechanism, operating without our conscious
awareness, 37 protects the senses from becoming overwhelmed by the
sheer multitude of external physical and social phenomena.38 To be
sure, culture could not exist if the brain did not contain some sort of
cognitive apparatus enabling individuals to divide the world into
perceptual categories so that objects, events, and environmental inter-
actions are instantaneously distinguished and absorbed.3 9 Such a cog-
nitive device also explains the capacity of human beings to experience
34. In this model of the mind, thought is a matter of sentences in the head. Linguistic
representations of information are purely formal and are operated on by the conventions
governing sentence structure. See Roy D'ANDRADE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE AN-
THROPOLOGY 136-37 (1995); William Bechtel, The Case for Connectionism, in MIND AND COG-
NITION 153, 156-58, 164 (William G. Lycan ed., 2d ed. 1999); Patricia Smith Churchland &
TerrenceJ. Sejnowski, Neurophilosophy and Connectionism, in MIND AND COGNITION 133, 138
(William G. Lycan ed., 2d ed. 1999); CLAUDIA STRAUSS & NAOMI QUINN, A COGNITIVE THE-
ORY OF CULTURAL MEANING 51 (1997).
35. See William G. Lycan, Introduction to MIND AND COGNITION 117, 117-18 (William G.
Lycan ed., 2d ed. 1999).
36. See David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power 79, 81 (1988). For a discussion on
both "rule-based" and "connectionist" types of thinking and their complementary aspects,
see Steven A. Sloman, Rational Versus Arational Models of Thought, in THE NATURE OF COGNI-
TION 557, 576-77 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999); STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at
51-59.
37. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 122, 136.
38. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 79-80, 84.
39. See id. at 79-80.
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gestalts, 40 perform complex pattern recognition tasks, 4' and convey
meaning through the use of tropes-e.g., metaphor, metonymy, and
mental imagery-in speech. 42
The fundamental building blocks of the cognitive architecture
are termed schemas: bounded symbolic unitary entities43 that cluster
together to form integrated bundles of information. 44 As templates
for the organization of experiences, schemas are built out of many-
typically nonverbal-encounters with specific instances.45 Schemas
constitute both object-like representations of abstract knowledge, 46 as
well as an unconscious and automatic information-processing sys-
tem.47 They function to classify and give structure to the substantive
content of experiences, 48 build complex pyramids of thought based
on a minimal input of data,49 and permit human beings to immedi-
ately recall the items stored in their memory.50 All environmental rep-
resentations are schematic abstractions. There are object schemas,
event schemas, narrative schemas, social schemas, cultural schemas,
40. A gestalt involves the psychological phenomenon of perceiving units of informa-
tion as an integrated whole. See GARY B. PALMER, TOWARD A THEORY OF CULTURAL LINGUIS-
TICS 291 (1996). The whole is simpler to grasp than the parts of the mental configuration.
See MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION,
AND REASON 41 (1987).
41. See Sloman, supra note 36, at 577.
42. Perhaps the most influential theory on the use of metaphors and metonymies can
be found in the writings of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. In general, they claim that
metaphors are the devices by which the understandings gained from one domain of expe-
rience are projected onto another. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE
BY 3-4 (1980). Knowledge of the workings of our own bodies acquired in daily living moti-
vates the creation of mental images, specifically, bodily-based metaphors. See id. at 69-76.
For example, because we sense that the body is a container, an object with an internal and
an external spatial dimension, we metaphorically extend this experience to interpret other
experiences-e.g., we walk out of a room and into another. For discussions related to the
container image and its metaphoric projections, see JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 30-31; see
also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra, at 98; and GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS
THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 271-73 (1987).
43. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 122.
44. See id. at 122-23; KERTZER, supra note 36, at 79. Strauss and Quinn explain that the
schematic architectural system is often called a "connectionist" or a "parallel distributed
processing" model of cognition because the computer, designed to simulate this method
of reasoning, consists of a series of weighted connections between units that work in con-
junction with each other. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 50-52 & 265 n.8.
D'Andrade similarly provides a detailed description of a connectionist-based computer. See
D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 136-41.
45. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 144-45.
46. See id. at 120, 179; KERTZER, supra note 36, at 79.
47. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 122, 136; LAKOFF, supra note 42, at 6.
48. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 40, at 18.
49. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 123-24, 136.
50. See id. at 144-45.
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metaphorical image schemas, and so on. 51 When relatively simple
schematic units combine, a composite configuration is formed, which
is perceived holistically, as a gestalt. 52 Gaps in information, details, or
features that are not present in what is seen, heard, or otherwise ex-
perienced, are filled in by context or normative expectations about
"what goes with what."53 Knowledge of the world is, thus, mediated by
this categorical system that partly selects what is observed, decides the
ways phenomena are perceived, and structures the information that
has been conveyed. 54
Moreover, a strong conservative bias is built into our understand-
ing because the schematic nature of our thoughts exerts a powerful
restraint on our interpretive processes.5 5 We reason through pre-given
conceptual classifications and single out just a small segment of an
entire universe of available data. 56 Although some schemas are flexi-
ble and easy to modify, well-organized and well-practiced schemas, so-
lidified by frequent past experiences, are rigid, historically durable,
and resistant to change. 57 Since it is cognitively efficient to rely on
these deeply-entrenched and well-traveled networks of thought, new
information, if in conflict with pre-established knowledge classifica-
tions, tends to be ignored. 58 Schemas are built out of encounters in
the environment and, in the absence of past experiences to create and
51. See id. at 132.
52. See id. at 123, 134, 136; PALMER, supra note 40, at 291; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note
34, at 53.
53. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 136. For example, consider the following state-
ment: John wanted to do well on the test, but his pen ran out of ink and his pencil broke."
Because there is a writing schema in our minds, we instantaneously grasp the fact that
running out of ink and not having a sharpened pencil lead toJohn not being able to write,
even though this information is not explicitly provided. See id. at 125.
54. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 79-80.
55. See id. at 80-81; see also MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONCEvrS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 36-37 (1996).
56. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 80.
57. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 142, 144-45. However, Strauss and Quinn em-
phasize the plasticity of schemas. They argue that, despite relatively stable cognitive net-
works, the meaning of a schematic formation depends on the context in which it is
activated and that contexts continually shift. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 54.
58. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 80. Schemas activated by experience undergo physi-
cal changes that strengthen their connections. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 90.
When one of these neuron-like units is reactivated, it usually activates the other neurons in
that particular group. See id. Schemas are thus self-reinforcing in that once a network of
interconnected units has become well-established, it fills in missing and ambiguous fea-
tures of encounters with the environment by firing all of the units, including those that
have not been directly stimulated. See id. at 90-91. As a result, new interactions with the
outside world tend to be interpreted in the same way as those that were experienced in the
past. See id. at 90.
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reinforce a schematic network, there is no pre-existing structure in
which to store the data.59 In contrast, rule-based serial symbolic knowl-
edge, described as verbal, explicit, slow, and deliberate, 60 requires an
arduous intentional processing of information on a conscious level
and, as a result, is easier to change, inasmuch as it is less fixed in the
mind.61
Cultural models, composed of schematic representations of im-
plicit knowledge about a given society, are especially difficult to mod-
ify, 6 2 yet at the same time, possess a sufficient amount of plasticity to
permit us to adapt to various social settings and irregularities in the
environment. 63 The following section addresses the development of
one particular cultural model, the folk model of natural kinds, which
is implicated in maintaining racism.
B. Natural Kinds Folk Models
Because knowledge is the product of a given culture's specific
world views, all schematic representations of abstract knowledge, in
this sense, are cultural constructs. A society's history, values, and insti-
tutional arrangements are a part of the environment; encounters with
a structured environment transmit culture and stimulate the growth
and reinforcement of schemata.64 However, either a single schema or
interrelated schemata can also form what is known as a cultural
model: a more elaborate framework for storing organized units of
complex social knowledge. 65 Cultural models, including common-
sense folk models, 66 incorporate ideas about the way the world is be-
59. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 80.
60. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 144, 180-81.
61. See id. at 144-45.
62. See id. at 178; SRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 54.
63. See Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn, Culture and Cognition, in CULTURAL MODELS
IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 6-7 (Dorothy Holland et al., eds., 1987).
64. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 122, 148-49. For related observations on the
interaction between the external world and the internal functioning of schematic images,
see JOHNSON, supra note 40, at 102.
65. See DANDRADE, supra note 34, at 151-52, 180.
66. Folk models consist of folk knowledge, the precursors of scientific knowledge.
These models refer to self-evident beliefs about the world-historically taken for granted-
that comport with common sense realism and intuition. Folk biology concerns naive un-
scientific classifications of plants and animals that people use in all parts of the world. See
ScoTr ATRAN, COGNITIvE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL HISTORY: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY
OF SCIENCE 1-2, 67 (1990). For example, although a tree does not constitute a botanically
valid taxon, most people presume a tree is a clearly defined botanical entity because it looks
like it is one. See id. at 67, 269.
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lieved to work in a given society, such as models of marriage, 67 the
mind, 68 gender, 69 and motherhood. 70 Models function heuristically to
build order out of a chaotic universe and, in so doing, both produce
and reflect a culture's social meaning system and view of reality.71
These conceptual constructs are part of what Jack Balkin terms "cul-
tural software" or cultural "know-how": the ideas, traditions, ideolo-
gies, and norms that stabilize a society and assure its continuation
from one generation to another.72
One important type of cultural folk model concerns classifica-
tions of animate objects. Anthropological and psychological studies
have demonstrated that numerous individuals adhere to phenomeno-
logical realism: the tendency to classify living things into what are be-
lieved to be "natural" and "correct" taxonomies, 73 and to hold in
one's mind a conceit that plants and animals possess a "natural" es-
sence and constitute "natural kinds" of things.74 In many cultures,
there is a belief that tigers, for example, have a certain essence which
makes them tigers, apart from their salient properties, like tails and
stripes. 75 Because certain traits are thought of as the indexical signs of
a plant or animal's "true" underlying nature, 76 taxonomic orderings
of animate objects are presumed to be predetermined by the similar-
ity in external morphological features. 77 Thus, a collie is apprehended
67. See Naomi Quinn, Convergent Evidence for a Cultural Model of American Marriage, in
CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 173 (Dorothy Holland et al., eds., 1987).
68. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 158-69.
69. See Dorothy Holland & Debra Skinner, Prestige and Intimacy: The Cultural Models
Behind Americans' Talk About Gender Types, in CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGIT
78 (Dorothy Holland et al., eds., 1987).
70. See LAKOFF, supra note 42, at 74-76. Lakoff defines these elaborate cultural knowl-
edge formations as "idealized cognitive models." Id. at 68.
71. For an analysis of cultural schemata, emphasizing that this domain of thought is
where meaning creation occurs, see DAVID L. SHAUL & N. LOUANNA FURBEE, LANGUAGE AND
CULTURE 204-05 (1998).
72. SeeJ. M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SovrwARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 57, 242 (1998).
Needless to say, the cultural meaning of an object or an event is shared by those with
similar histories. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 82. Since different subcultures
have dissimilar experiences, the way in which cognitive networks evolve and the interpreta-
tions of phenomena will vary. See id. at 83. Also, there are bound to be distinctions in
cultural meanings within any given social group. See id. On the other hand, shared mean-
ings exist to the extent that there are domains of common experiences. See id. The net-
works of connection among schematic units could, quite possibly, be similar, regardless of
the variety in social understandings. See id. at 83-84.
73. See ATRAN, supra note 66, at 77-78; see also LAKOFF, supra note 42, at 118-19.
74. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 104, 176; see also LAKOFF, supra note 42, at 118-19.
75. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 176.
76. See ATRAN, supra note 66, at 78.
77. See id. at 80.
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as a dog because its observable attributes-e.g., tail, nose, and bark-
instantiate an essential "dogginess. '' 78 Once dogs are classified in this
manner, individual dogs who do not share all of the salient character-
istics are, nevertheless, still included in the dog taxonomy because
they share in the fundamental essence.7 9 A dog born without legs re-
mains a dog because, according to our ordinary way of thinking, all
dogs are quadrupeds,80 whereas a chair (an inanimate object) without
legs is no longer a chair.81
Interestingly enough, these classification systems are quickly
learned and seem to be a universal phenomenon. 2 Even in cultures
without an explicitly delineated natural kinds theory, it is likely there
is an implicit natural kinds model influencing the reasoning of indi-
viduals on a non-discursive level.83 There are several explanations of
the origin of natural kind taxonomies and why they are internalized
within a very short period of time. One school of thought argues that
the human propensity to categorize according to natural kinds is ge-
netic,84 while another contends it is an entirely cultural phenome-
non.8 5 The most persuasive explanation is offered by the noted
cognitive psychologist, Eleanor Rosch. Rosch maintains that folk tax-
onomies and natural essence theories are brought about through the
observation of the most closely correlated attributes between various
objects and the human ability to discern a pattern, as well as to group
these attributes into a schematic configurational gestalt. 86 The per-
ceived patterns are used to sort objects into different types of things.8 7
Basic level objects 8 are formed out of these gestalt configurations of
78. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 93.
79. See id. at 176.
80. See id.; see also ATRAN, supra note 66, at 6.
81. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 104.
82. See ATRAN, supra note 66, at 70-71, 78.
83. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 177.
84. See ATRAN, supra note 66, at 65 ("Humans... are endowed with highly articulated
cognitive faculties for 'fast-mapping' the world .... The 'automatic' taxonomic ordering
of phenomenal species, like the spontaneous relational ordering of colors, would then be a
likely product of one such faculty.") (citation omitted).
85. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 177.
86. See id. at 117-18, 120, 177.
87. See id. at 120.
88. In general, basic level objects fit within a taxonomy as neither a superordinate nor
a subordinate category:
Superordinate Basic Level Subordinate
Furniture Table Kitchen table
Chair Kitchen chair
Tree Oak White oak
Maple Silver maple
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salient characteristics and serve as the prototypes-e.g., the best exam-
ples or the "cognitive representatives"-of particular categories.89 The
human capacity to automatically see patterns in nature, coupled with
the proclivity to involuntarily classify what is observed in their sur-
roundings, suggests folk models of natural kinds are shielded from
rational criticism and logical argumentation precisely because the
overall process is unconscious and the knowledge is implicitly
gained.90 Patterns predicated on patently obvious similarities in exter-
nal characteristics are so easily observed that they appear to be a part
of the inevitable order of things and nature's way of organizing the
world.
It should be noted that, even though natural kind folk taxono-
mies are ubiquitous, there is no classification system that is objectively
the "true" or "natural" method for describing plants and animals.
George Lakoff provides a stunning example of the arbitrary nature of
classification systems and shows there are no "natural kinds" of spe-
cies. 91 He explains that none of the taxonomies used by evolutionary
biologists are traditional or natural in the sense that species are not
grouped according to their fundamental and sufficient properties.
For one thing, we need objective criteria in order to determine which
properties are the relevant ones, but no such standards exists.92 The
various methodologies employed by evolutionary biologists in creating
homogeneous groupings demonstrate that categories are not out
there in nature, waiting to be discovered, but, rather, are created by
the inventive faculties of scientists whose theoretical perspectives are,
to a large extent, incommensurable.9 3 Still, essentialism and the out-
moded idea of a pre-existing order in nature continue to exercise a
See id. at 117; see also Brian H. Ross & Valerie S. Makin, Prototype Versus Exemplar Models in
Cognition, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION 205, 225-27 (RobertJ. Sternberg ed., 1999).
89. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 117-18, 120.
90. See id. at 178 (commenting that, because cultural models are built out of implicit
knowledge, they are resistant to rational critiques).
91. See LAKOFF, supra note 42, at 121. Lakoffs argument is principally based on STE-
PHEN JAY GOULD, HEN'S TEETH AND HORSE's TOEs 355-65 (1983). See LAKOFF, supra note 42,
at 119-120, 185.
92. See LAKOFF, supra note 42, at 186. Some scientists employ the biological species
concept in which classifications are based on morphological similarities, reproduction, ad-
aptation to a specific ecological domain, and gene pools. See id. at 119. The phenetic spe-
cies concept looks at overall similarities, whereas the cladistic method traces the
evolutionary history of the derived attributes, yielding a taxonomy in which a lungfish is
more closely related to a rhino than it is to a tuna. See id. at 119-20 (citing JAY GOULD,
HEN'S TEETH AND HoRSE's TOES 365 (1983)).
93. See id. at 120-121, 186.
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hold on the collective imagination.94 Although we necessarily depend
on the stability of schematized folk models, which, like all cultural
models, allow us to comprehend and navigate the environment, these
deeply-embedded, cognitive structures also limit our capacity to re-
think our intuitive assumptions about phenomena and to reconceive
reality. Furthermore, not only is there a tendency to group plants and
animals according to their natural essence, human beings are also
subjected to the very same kind of classification system.
C. Natural Kinds of Human Beings and the Inherent Capacity to
Classify on the Basis of Color
Roy D'Andrade observes that natural kind theory lends itself to
the generalization that what is believed to be true about plants and
animals applies equally to human beings.9 5 It is a short step from the
notion that tigers and elephants are different natural kinds to the no-
tion that there are natural kind distinctions among groups of peo-
ple. 96 Also, numerous studies inform us that, due to our
neurophysiology (specifically, in this case, the interaction of the retina
with certain frequencies of light), there is an innate human capacity
to differentiate basic colors (black, white, red, green, blue, and yel-
low), and to experience color categorization as a gestalt.97 So, along
with animal and plant taxonomies, color is another primary way of
classifying the environment; indeed, sorting objects on the basis of
color is a crucial, fundamental skill humans rely upon in countless
ways during the course of daily living.
Certainly, awareness of differences in colorations is not, in itself,
racist and has obvious and significant survival benefits (for instance,
we need to distinguish red from green traffic lights). Nevertheless,
because individuals automatically notice variance in color among ob-
jects in the world, including human beings, color distinctions might
well be linked to and support the cultural folk model of natural
kinds.98 Thus, some individuals could still be susceptible to imagining
94. See id. at 121 (noting that some scientists convey the impression that they believe
there is only one "correct" taxonomy).
95. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 178; see also ATRAN, supra note 66, at 78.
96. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 178.
97. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 40, at 80-82; LAKOW, supra note 42, at 24-30, 269-71.
A historical analysis of basic color terms, basic color categories, and current theories on the
relationship between color, culture, and neurophysiology can be found in SHAUL &
FURBEE, supra note 71, at 75-76.
98. One interesting and important ethnographic study reports that, in Papua New
Guinea, skin color has profound metaphysical implications in addition to signifying dis-
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that the ancestral and genetic history of blacks is separate from the
genealogy of whites, 99 with a corollary that color is the means by which
a distinct hierarchy of human beings is manifested.' 00 I hasten to add
that a natural kinds folk model is not necessarily an inevitable entail-
ment of the human capacity to classify colors. I also do not suggest
that all white persons hold a race-based natural kinds model in their
minds. Rather, I claim that color is very likely to be implicated in a
folk model of natural kinds in a society such as ours, with a notable
history of ideological racism. Recall that this folk model provided a
basis for the justification of slavery. 101 Nonetheless, although our cul-
ture lends itself to a racist natural kinds taxonomy, the workings of
our cognitive processing system itself are partly responsible for the
tendency to essentialize human beings. The reason is that human be-
ings are unable to comprehend all features of reality.
The cognitive skill of grouping schemata together in order to
build cultural models is indispensable to our ability to function in our
surroundings. If forced to use serial symbolic logic, assimilating and
responding to each and every event in our perceptual field of vision
would take an inordinate amount of time and would be an over-
whelmingly arduous undertaking. 0 2 However, in relying on a cultural
model to accelerate the processing of information, we sacrifice knowl-
edge of many aspects of our environment.
tinct types of human beings. See DON KULICK, LANGUAGE SHIFT AND CULTURAL REPRODUC-
TION: SOCIALITATION, SELF AND SYNCRETISM IN A PAPUA NEW GUINEAN VILLAGE 160 (1992).
After living in one village for about a month, the author, a white man, was told that he was
a ghost. See id. at ix. The villagers believe that dark skin turns white upon death. See id. at
171. They also believe that, eventually, their dark skin will "buckle and crack" and that
their new white skin will bring money, automobiles, roads, and factories-all the trappings
of a white European society. Id. at 160. This metamorphosis is imbued with messianic over-
tones of Christianity. See id. It also provides the indigenous people with a coherent frame-
work for understanding the impact of Western culture on their society. See id.
99. See ATRAN, supra note 66, at 7 (stating that the idea of an underlying essence could
be extended to other domains, like human groupings, solidifying the intransigence of
racism).
100. In a similar vein, Lawrence contends that the myth of racial inferiority continues
to be a part of our cultural belief system, although it is no longer openly expressed. See
Lawrence, supra note 12, at 374. For this reason, polls indicate that most whites do not
consider discrimination to be the cause of black inequality. See id. In contrast, Appiah
claims that, because of the Holocaust, racial essence theories now tend to be formulated in
more modified forms, and a belief in the cultural inferiority of blacks has replaced the
older model. See Appiah, supra note 7, at 83.
101. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
102. For an explanation of the disadvantages incurred in using this style of reasoning,
see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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First, because it is cognitively efficient to categorize items as
quickly as possible, our cognitive classification system serves to limit
the characteristics that are taken into account in sorting a multitude
of observable objects. 10 3 We are programmed to swiftly focus on only a
few features that are considered salient, and we rely on these features
to classify an entity. 10 4 Human beings are catalogued in this manner,
and, thereby, are reduced to just a few of their many attributes.
Second, because we automatically differentiate between the col-
ors of various phenomena, color has become a salient feature that
determines an individual's place in the order of things. Once color
becomes the focal point, it is not easy to see the numerous non-color
based characteristics of an individual, the many attributes all persons
share, and the uniqueness or the specialness of one specific human
being.10 5 Thus, the cognitive efficiency of our minds facilitates the di-
vision of human beings into separate color groupings; nonetheless, it
is culture that ranks these groupings and establishes a hierarchy.
Here, we see the workings of the interaction between cognition and
culture: color-based categories of human beings, spontaneously pro-
duced through the activation of networks and schematic units, are
thought to provide "scientific" proof of the existence of race as a "nat-
ural" phenomenon. Apparently, the cognitive advantage of being able
to instantaneously engage in pattern-recognition tasks and form as-
sociations between entities is equally disadvantageous when it comes
to basing distinctions on external morphological features that are en-
coded with negative social meanings.
Moreover, introducing a change in cognitive processing by either
altering or erasing a folk model from consciousness is somewhat prob-
lematic in light of a model's durability and the degree to which it is
constantly reinforced. In the following section, this Article sets forth
the ways in which the interaction between culture and cognition
works against the breakdown of a folk model generated by the doc-
trine of natural kinds. This section then shows how a model can be
modified despite the stability of this highly complex schematic
structure.
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D. Reforming a Natural Kinds Folk Model: The Difficulties
Encountered and the Catalysts That Inaugurate
a Change
Because cultural models rest on neural-like schematic structures,
they are extremely sturdy mental constructs that tend to be impervi-
ous to restructuring. When co-occurring features of experience re-
peatedly activate specific neuron-like units, they strengthen the
connections between schematic units in a neural network. 10 6 In the
future, if one of these units is fired, all the other units in that network
are automatically simulated as well, thereby reinforcing the neural
connections. 10 7 As such, once a cultural folk model is installed in the
mind and reinforced through continual cultural imprinting, patterns
of strong neural connections evolve that are not easily disturbed. Fur-
thermore, exactly what is experienced in the social environment is a
matter of interpretation, and our readings of the social scene tend to
correspond with widely-shared cultural expectations. The belief in the
inferiority of African-Americans is reinforced, thus strengthening the
schematic networks that constitute the model simply by interpreting a
social encounter in a manner that confirms the model's credibility.' 0 8
When a teacher, for example, is already convinced that black students
are not as intelligent as white students, mistakes in a spelling test,
which would hardly be meaningful if committed by a white student,
take on a significance if the student is black; the interpretation of the
event corroborates the cultural expectation and solidifies the connec-
tions between the corresponding schemata that form the model. 10 9
Beliefs in a racist folk model of natural kinds also produce the
sort of behavior that forecloses the possibility of altering the initial
determination of inferiority. This is because a schematically-structured
stereotype about a group of people tends to induce self-reinforcing
behavior.110 For instance, if white children are raised in an atmos-
phere in which relatives, peers, and other authority figures transmit
negative attitudes concerning the genetic inferiority of African-Ameri-
cans, they are likely to avoid associating with blacks as adults."1 In
turn, the lack of social interactions will result in fewer opportunities
106. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 90.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 90-91.
109. A related hypothetical is presented by Strauss and Quinn involving the reinforce-
ment of negative stereotypes. See id. at 91.
110. See id. at 90-91.
111. See id. at 91.
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for the children to discover that the original premise is false. 112 Expo-
sure to certain experiences, inconsistent with an individual's expecta-
tions, can evoke powerful emotional responses that lead to a large-
scale change in the existing racist cultural models.11 3
In addition, a negative cultural stereotypical representation of a
social group in a widely-shared folk model has a detrimental affect on
the group's members and can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Psy-
chological studies demonstrate that African-Americans perform less
well than whites on verbal tests if they are told that the test is an indi-
cator of intellectual ability.'1 4 On the other hand, if this information is
not provided, the black and white performance rates are the same.' 15
The obvious interpretation of this statistical finding is that African-
Americans are less able to concentrate on the test because of their
concern that their scores will confirm their negative stereotype (a ster-
eotype which need not even be internalized) and that they will be
judged accordingly." 6 Indeed, the ensuing disparity in test scores re-
inforces the stereotype; those who are white and evaluate the results
conclude that there must be an underlying truth to the old adage that
blacks are by nature mentally inferior to whites." 7
Along with self-reinforcement and self-fulfilling prophesies, one
of the most important reasons for the strength and endurance of a
natural kinds folk model has to do with the nature of connectionist-
based reasoning. As previously stated, unlike serial symbolic reason-
ing, involving conscious deliberations and rule-based logical infer-
ences, connectionist reasoning is largely unconscious and consists of
the formation of strong associations between schematic units and the
building of cultural models." 8 Recall that new information, at odds
with pre-existing knowledge constructs, is likely to be overlooked if
there is no pre-existing schematic framework to receive the data." 9
Hence, the teacher who is already predisposed to see blacks as men-
tally inferior to whites easily absorbs information about the spelling
112. See id.
113. See id. at 98-99 (claiming that, at times, experiences are powerful enough to in-
duce a change, and that some experiences are very likely to modify stereotypes).
114. See id. at 92; see also Stephen J. Ceci et al., Laboratory Versus Field Approaches to Cogni-
tion, in THE NATURE OF COGNITION, 385, 398-99 (RobertJ. Sternber ed., 1999).
115. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 92; see also Ceci et al., supra note 114, at
399.
116. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 92; see also Ceci et al., supra note 114, at
398-99.
117. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 92.
118. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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mistakes of one black student, but could be totally unaware of another
black student in the class who has never made a mistake in spelling.
Also recall that the implicit knowledge contained in cultural models
tends to be unaffected by logical analysis because natural kind catego-
ries are unconsciously created and appear to be a part of nature's
workings. 120 Demonstrable scientific evidence discounting race as a
biological category and well-documented proof of the similarities be-
tween human beingst 2' affects only the surface level of cognition. This
information does not reach the deep mental substrata where the
taken-for-granted, self-evident knowledge contained within the model
can be found. It is hardly surprising then, that sophisticated scholarly
theories, as well as the formal laws and informal social norms aimed at
abolishing racist ideas and practices, have been less than successful.
Overcoming racism could well require finding a way to dislodge the
cognitive biases in the minds of whites.1 22
Still, a racist cultural model is not entirely immune from change.
Knowledge acquired through serial symbolic processing changes
more rapidly,123 but even a schematic knowledge structure can break
down over time. Old schemas are occasionally revised or rejected, and
new ones are formed, if there is sufficient exposure to novel exper-
120. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & Amy
GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 114-15 (1996) (citing to
various sources and stating that "[s]cientists calculate the average genetic difference be-
tween two randomly chosen individuals is .2 percent ... of the total genetic material").
122. Some scientists rely on implicit folk knowledge of natural kinds and, in addition
to scientific knowledge, this older tradition of common sense interpretations of phenom-
ena influences their choice of a research agenda. I suspect that the findings set forth in The
Bell Curve, that there is a statistical correlation between genetics and intelligence which
purportedly proves the innate intellectual inferiority of the black race, is one notorious
example of how a natural kinds episteme can direct the selection of a topic and encourage
the use of a result-driven methodology. See RICHARDJ. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE
BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 269-70, 298 (1994).
Surely, any theory claiming the existence of inherent cognitive differences amongst ethnic
groups comes perilously close to a natural kinds philosophy. See Michael Stern, A Dystopian
Fable, in THE BELL CURVE DEBATE: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS 115, 117 (RussellJacoby
& Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995). The author states, "At the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution .. . the Victorians began to wonder if the new urban poor ... constituted a
breed apart from 'normal' humanity. The Bell Curve really operates on this level." Id. at 117.
The popularity of this book, and the fact that one of its authors played a prominent role in
public policy-making decisions concerning welfare reform, indicate the degree to which
our culture remains committed to a race-based natural kinds ontology. See Horsburgh,
supra note 7, at 565.
123. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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iences that stimulate the growth of alternative constructs. 124 Change is
also brought about when there is a sharp disjunction between percep-
tions and the knowledge classifications that have been schematized in
the mind. 125 Similarly, a model can undergo a transformation when
the actions taken in response to an interpretation of an event lead to
unanticipated and undesirable consequences. 126 Furthermore, the af-
fective content of an experience plays a motivating role in terms of
either reinforcing or challenging a preconceived stereotype in a sche-
matic construct. 127 The participation in or observation of some events
or activities can so upset one's settled convictions about a social group
that it arouses a strong emotional reaction which can accelerate the
process by which a cultural schema is reformed.' 28 Finally, it is possi-
ble to make a deliberate and conscious effort to revise one's previous
opinion and adopt a more tolerant point of view. 129
Strauss and Quinn provide us with a relevant example of how a
change in a schematic structure can occur.1 30 Consider a woman who
is a middle-class, white suburbanite and has had little experience with
inner-city blacks.13' Alone in a strange city, she is approached by a
black man in shabby clothes. 132 Because the woman associates black
males with violence, she becomes afraid and quickly runs down the
street. 33 In point in fact, the man thought she looked lost and had
stopped to ask if she needed directions.1 34 If the woman had not fled
but had waited to hear what the man had to say, the negative stereo-
type in her mind might have been overturned just by this powerful
experience. While some individuals are more open to altering their
preconceived ideas than others, at times, schema-inconsistent behav-
ior can be so markedly distinct from cultural expectations that it
evokes responses which block the activation of old associations and
initiate the formation of new ones. 35 Fortunately, the mind is adapta-
124. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 81-82; see also STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at
98-99 (stating "schema-inconsistent behavior" is markedly noticeable as well as memora-
ble, and thus is very likely to initiate a change in a cultural stereotype).
125. See KERTZER, supra note 36, at 81-82.
126. See id.
127. See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 34, at 98-99.
128. See id. at 99.
129. See id. at 100-01.
130. See id. at 91, 99.
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ble, and culture does not necessarily determine all that we think and
know about the-world; culture is not a "perceptual veil" between real-
ity and experience, conditioning our understandings to such an ex-
tent that we are unable to rethink our habitual responses. 136
Conclusion
The fact that cultural forces do not preclude our possibilities for
change gives us hope that we can build up new cultural models re-
garding the commonality of humankind that act as countervailing
forces against the predisposition to derogatorily categorize specific
groups of people. What is further needed is the formulation of a new
experiential gestalt in the minds of whites: a schematic cluster in
which units of information about certain prevailing social arrange-
ments are labeled racist, notwithstanding the absence of intentionality
on the part of those who are involved in the activities that are subject
to scrutiny. In fact, the very endurance of existing schematic con-
structs augurs that the new more tolerant models about human beings
that eventually take root in the mind will be sturdy enough to with-
stand the pressure of the past.
However, we need not passively await the emergence of a change
in cultural models. Cognitive studies have informed us that models
are experientially based, evolving out of recurrent social events and
activities. Cognitive findings also have demonstrated that logical serial
symbolic reasoning is not necessarily an effective or suitable tool to
use in attempting to eliminate racist habits of thought. It seems clear,
then, that a practice-based methodology, as opposed to a theoretical
perspective or an analytical argument, is the appropriate strategy we
should adopt to combat racism. Specifically, we should find ways to
encourage frequent and regular interactions between blacks and
whites so as to initiate the formation and reinforcement of more posi-
tive cultural models. This micro-centered approach focuses on the
creation of concrete and localized forms of integration: the building
of microsociological structures in which African-Americans and whites
come together on an everyday basis to pursue common goals and in-
terests in conveniently-located, informal settings. For example, we
should encourage the growth of more integrated civic associations
that are concerned with improving the community and providing vari-
ous kinds of services. Organizing integrated fund-raising events for lo-
cal charities and coalitions to press for the preservation of the
136. See D'ANDRADE, supra note 34, at 149.
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environment, or historical sites and buildings, could also be effective
in promoting contacts between social groups. These types of collective
engagements where people participate in ordinary community-related
projects can lead to significant changes in social attitudes. The silent
voice of prejudice that finds expression in a folk model can be coun-
tered by actions more than words-actions that foster bonds of soli-
darity between human beings who, after all, share the very same
architectural structure in their minds.
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